Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Unfair Competition by Duft, Donald M. & Dorr, Robert C.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 52 
Issue 1 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 19 
March 2021 
Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Unfair Competition 
Donald M. Duft 
Robert C. Dorr 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Donald M. Duft & Robert C. Dorr, Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Unfair Competition, 52 Denv. L.J. 
309 (1975). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS,
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
By DONALD M. DuFr* AND ROBERT C. DoRR**
The Tenth Circuit considered five cases on appeal involving
patents, copyrights, and unfair competition this past term. There
were no cases involving trademarks. The most important case,
Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc.I
which involved record and tape piracy, has contributed to a wid-
ening split among the circuits with the Tenth Circuit joining the
Ninth Circuit in ruling against the tape pirate. Although the
Supreme Court has not ruled on a petition for certiorari by the
"tape pirate," the Court has invited the Solicitor General to file
a brief expressing the views of the United States.2 The Marks case
will be analyzed in the ensuing case comment.
In Moore v. Shultz, 3 Judge Seth writing for the majority
stated that the presumption of validity for a patent can be over-
come only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence by the
alleged infringer. The Moore case provides a good vehicle for a
partial summary of the Tenth Circuit's position on patent valid-
ity and infringement. The patent at issue involved a pants top-
ping machine which was composed of elements old in the art, but
combined so as to produce new and improved results. Judge Seth
stated that McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc.,' set forth
the Tenth Circuit rule for patentability:
The test of whether a particular patent is a mere aggregation and
invalid or a combination and valid has been variously stated. Gener-
ally, where elements old in the art are united in such a way that a
new and useful result is secured or an old result is attained in a more
facile, economical and efficient manner, there is a patentable com-
bination.'
* Patent Attorney, Boulder, Colorado; B.S., 1949, Illinois Institute of Technology;
LL.B., 1953, New York University; LL.M., 1971, New York University.
** B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engineering; M.S., 1970, Northwestern Univer-
sity; J.D., 1974, University of Denver.
497 F.2d 285, rehearing en banc, 497 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1974).
BNA PAT., T.M., & COPYRIGHT J., No. 199, A-17 (Oct. 17, 1974) [hereinafter cited
as BNA].
3 491 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1974).
343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 393 (citations omitted).
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Here, Shultz had failed to prove the Moore patent invalid and he
was, therefore, found guilty of infringement.
The Tenth Circuit in Moore adhered to its previous view that
all three elements of patentability-novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness-present issues of fact. The court held to this
view even though it recognized that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have held nonobviousness to be an issue of law.
The court after upholding the jury finding of nonobviousness
and, thus, the validity of the patent, then pursued Moore's claim
of Shultz's infringement by equivalency. It reiterated the Tenth
Circuit test and found that Moore proved his infringement claim:
The question of equivalency is one of fact and it must be determined
against the context of the patent, the prior art and the particular
circumstances of the case and consideration must be given to the
purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it
has when combined with the other ingredients and the function it
is intended to perform.'
Shultz, the alleged infringer, petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari asserting that the question of obviousness was not
within the province of a jury and that the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits supported the correct view. The Court denied certiorari,7
but Mr. Justice Douglas filed a dissent agreeing with the peti-
tioner:
The decision [by the Tenth Circuit] . . .represents an abdication
which is likely to produce haphazard application of the statutory
and constitutional standard. Happily, two other circuits have not
adopted this approach!'
Douglas reasoned that the constitutionally granted and protected
17-year patent monopoly "is one that demands reasoned elabora-
tion and, therefore, treatment as a question of law" and that such
responsibility is vested in the courts, not for the "unarticulated
resolution by the jury.
' 'g
Without explanation or discussion of Moore, the Tenth Cir-
cuit recently in Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc.'0 appar-
ently reversed its stance on nonobviousness:
1 491 F.2d at 300, quoting McCullough Tool Co. v. Wells Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381,
401 (10th Cir. 1965).
BNA, No. 200, A-13 (Oct. 24, 1974).
1 Id. at A-14, citing Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 395 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1968); Hensley
Equipment Co. v. Esco Corp., 375 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1967).
BNA, No. 200, A-14 (Oct. 24, 1974).
183 U.S.P.Q. 519 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Ascertainment of the scope of the prior art and determination of the
difference between the prior art and the claims in suit together with
the level of skill in the art are all questions of fact. Whether in light
of these factual matters the patent is obvious then becomes a ques-
tion of law."
The proper resolution of Price in view of Moore has not been
undertaken in this issue due to the timeliness of Price. Hopefully,
next year's survey will consider this interesting contradiction.
In Iron Ore Co. of Canada v. Dow Chemical Co., 2 the plain-
tiff sued the defendant for infringement of the plaintiff's patent
for "detonable explosive in slurry form." The defendant raised
the defense that the plaintiff's patent was invalid since the inven-
tion was disclosed in defendant's prior patent. The trial court
found the patent invalid and the plaintiff appealed to the Tenth
Circuit arguing that the claims should be interpreted in light of
the terms found in the specification. The specification used the
terminology "completely water soaked" whereas the claims made
no mention of such limitation. The plaintiff maintained that its
patent would be valid if the claims were read to include this
limitation. The Tenth Circuit in affirming the ruling of the trial
court reasoned that since the term "completely water soaked" did
not appear in the claims, then the trial court's finding was not
clearly erroneous.
In Maloney-Crawford Tank Corp. v. Rocky Mountain Natu-
ral Gas Co.," Judge Hill considered whether a 7-year interval
between the first knowledge of infringement and the commence-
ment of the suit supported a defense based on laches. In resolving
the issue, he set forth (1) the Third Circuit's view "that mere
delay or passage of time alone does not suffice to constitute laches
in a patent infringement action,"' 4 and (2) the elements required
in the Tenth Circuit to sustain a defense of laches:
[T]wo elements must be established: inexcusable delay in institut-
ing suit, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from such
delay. . . .And whether or not a delay is inexcusable must be de-
termined by the particular facts of each case."
Hill found no "clearly erroneous" error in the trial court's finding
" Id. at 521.
12 500 F.2d 189 (10th Cir. 1974).
.3 494 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 403, citing Jenn-Air Corp. v. Penn Ventilator Co., 464 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1972).
" 494 F.2d at 403 (citations omitted).
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of infringement after having found the delay to be excusable and
of no prejudice to the defendant.
In Kodekey Electronics, Inc. v. Mechanex Corp.," the Tenth
Circuit considered an alleged theft by Mechanex of a trade secret
concerning electronic speedometers manufactured by Kodekey.
Mechanex acquired the exclusive rights to market Kodekey's
speedometers. In exchange, Mechanex agreed to "keep confiden-
tial all proprietary information regarding Electronic Speedome-
ters . . . and not to use this information in any way detrimental
to the interests of [Kodekey]." 7
Mechanex subsequently began to manufacture a speedome-
ter similar to Kodekey's. Kodekey thereupon brought suit, the
district court found a clear breach of contract, and enjoined the
production of the Mechanex speedometer.
Mechanex appealed arguing that for a trade secret to be
protected there must be a showing of uniqueness and value. The
Tenth Circuit following the Restatement of Torts held that
"[niovelty and invention are not requisite for a trade secret."' 8
Judge Barnes writing for the unanimous three-judge panel
defined a trade secret to be
[a]ny formula, patent, device, plan, or compilation of information
which may be used in one's business and which gives a person an
opportunity over his competitor."
He then relied on Callman:20
An employee's express agreement "not to disclose any of the pro-
cesses and methods" of his employer is a positive acknowledgment
of the fact that some of such processes and methods are secret; the
stipulation would otherwise be meaningless. .. .
to conclude:
Such an interpretation applies with stronger reason to an agreement
between a secret-holder and a non-employee than between owner
and employee.2
The Tenth Circuit, therefore, upheld the district court's finding
of a trade secret theft.
1" 486 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1973).
'1 Id. at 451.
11 RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs § 757 (1939).
1 486 F.2d at 455, citing International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 907, 914 (D. Del. 1951).
20 CALLMAN, UNFAIR CoMPErrmION TRADE & MONOPOLIES (1968).
"1 486 F.2d at 455, quoting CALLMAN, supra note 20, § 53.3 at 390 (footnote omitted).
2 486 F.2d at 455.
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COPYRIGHT LAW-TAPE PIRACY- COMPULSORY
LICENSING PROVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc.
497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974)
INTRODUCTION
In Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics,
Inc.,13 the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit 4 in construing
the compulsory licensing provision, section 1(e), 5 of the Copy-
right Act in favor of the copyright holder and against the "tape
pirate." The Marks decision furthers a split among the circuits
since a decision by the New Jersey District Court 6 reached the
opposite opinion.
Marks, a musical composition copyright owner, brought a
copyright infringement action against Colorado Magnetics, the
alleged "tape pirate," in the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Oklahoma, seeking damages and injunctive relief for elec-
tronic tape duplication by Magnetics of hit records authorized by
Marks and containing its musical compositions. The district
court concluded that such duplication was not barred by section
1(e) and in its decision adopted verbatim the findings and conclu-
sions submitted by Magnetics." Marks appealed and a three-
judge panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court deci-
sion by a 2-1 vote.25 On rehearing en banc, the majority opinion
of Judge McWilliams was sustained by a vote of 5-2 with Chief
Judge Lewis and Judge Holloway dissenting.29 Judge Murrah, a
member of the original three-judge panel, recused.
Magnetics then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme
Court."0 The Supreme Court, not yet acting on the petition, has
invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views
of the United States.
3'
' 497 F.2d 285, aff'd on rehearing, 497 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1974).
2 Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847
(1972).
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) [hereinafter cited as section 1(e)].
N Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J.
1972).
" Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Okla. 1973).
- 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 292.
" Petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1974)(No. 73-2006).
11 BNA, No. 199, A-17 (Oct. 17, 1974).
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A brief discussion of the history and evolution of section 1(e)
is set forth in the following section in order to provide a founda-
tion for subsequent detailed analysis and critique of Marks. The
line of precedence supporting the Marks holding will then be
discussed followed by a consideration of the precedence opposing
the Marks view. Finally, other remedies for obtaining relief
against tape piracy will be briefly presented.
I. HISTORY OF SECTION 1(e)
Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909,2 the Supreme Court held
in White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 3 that mechanical re-
productions of copyrighted musical compositions, such as perfor-
ated piano rolls and records, were not infringing copies and,
therefore, that the copyright owner did not have a copyright in-
fringement remedy against these "piano roll pirates."
Pressure from the music industry for greater protection after
Apollo prompted Congress to include section 1(e)" in their new
Copyright Act. Section 1(e) extended the scope of the composer's
copyright protection by giving him the right to control (i.e., to
permit or to not permit) the first mechanical reproduction of his
work. This right was one of "control" only and did not give the
composer a copyrightable interest in the recording.3 At the same
time, Congress had no desire to create a recording monopoly for
the composer copyright owner and it, therefore, expressly worded
section 1(e) to require that after the first authorized mechanical
reproduction is produced, subsequent recordings can be made by
anyone upon tender of a 2-cent royalty per recording with proper
notice to the copyright holder.
32 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Copyright Act of 1909].
209 U.S. 1 (1908).
It was this situation that your committee had in view when they
sought to formulate a law which would give to the composer the exclusive
right to prohibit the reproduction of his music by mechanical means on the
part of anybody if he desired, to secure to him adequate compensation from
all reproducers if he did not desire to exercise this exclusive right to prohibit
and to prevent the establishment of a great trade monopoly. We fully believe
that all this will be secured under the provisions of subsection (e).
HOUSE COMM. ON PATENTS, COMM. REP. ON BILL (H.R. 28192) ENACTING COPYRiHT ACT OF
1909, No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909), reproduced in, HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW
230 (4th ed. 1962). (emphasis added)[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
It is not the intention of the committee to extend the right of copyright
to the mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the composer
or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions of the
bill, of the manufacture and use of such devices.
HOUSE REPORT, at 9.
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Section 1(e) was a significant departure from all prior statu-
tory copyright protection concepts." Most other countries at that
time allowed anyone to reproduce freely compositions mechani-
cally with no compensation to the composer." The intent of Con-
gress in breaking with tradition was that "justice and fair dealing
. . . [requires that the] composer should have some compensa-
tion . . . . s Congress, however, was also concerned that a
[d]anger lies in the possibility that some one company might se-
cure, by purchase or otherwise, a large number of copyrights of the
most popular music, and by controlling these copyrights monopolize
the business of manufacturing and selling music-producing ma-
chines, otherwise free to the world."A
Congress believed that the compulsory licensing provision was
the solution to (1) providing adequate compensation to the com-
poser while (2) keeping music available to all:
The only way to effect both purposes . . . was, after giving the
composer the exclusive right to prohibit the use of his music by the
mechanical reproducers, to provide that if he used or permitted the
use of his music for such purpose then, upon the payment of a
reasonable royalty, all who desire might reproduce the music.4'
Section 1(e) of the Copyright Act reads in pertinent part:
Provided . . . as a condition of extending the copyright control to
such mechanical reproductions, that whenever the owner of a musi-
cal copyright has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the
use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving
to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may
make similar use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to the
copyright proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part manu-
factured, to be paid by the manufacturer thereof . . .
Before proceeding further, the reader is invited to conjecture
as to the meaning of the word "similar" with regard to defining
the rights, if any, of the "pirate" under section 1(e). Does the
term (1) prohibit piracy, (2) permit piracy or (3) neither? Does
No legislative body in the world has as yet taken such advanced
ground in . . . securing the rights of composers in the matter of the
reproduction by mechanical means of their music as is contemplated by this
bill.
Id. at 5.
In 1895, Austria clearly favored the mechanical reproduction of copyrighted compo-
sitions: "The manufacture and public use of instruments for mechanical reproduction of
music records shall be no infringement of the copyrighted music." Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
" Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909).
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"similar" refer to the act of recording? Or does it characterize the
style or the content of the "similar" recording?
A few years after the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909, a
federal district court in Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 2
held that section 1(e) does not permit a pirate to duplicate the
piano rolls of the first authorized mechanical reproducer. After
Aeolian and until the era of Jondora Music Publishing Co. v.
Melody Recordings, Inc. ,'3 (in favor of the pirate), Duchess Music
Corp. v. Stern" and Fame Publishing Co. v. S & S Distributors,
Inc. 5 and Marks (the latter three against the pirate), the issue of
record piracy and its relationship to section 1(e) has not been
extensively litigated.
In 1971, Congress became increasingly aware of the growth
and extent of tape piracy" and enacted the federal record piracy
act 7 which became effective on February 15, 1972, for a trial
period of 5 years. The act is prospective only and is not retroac-
tive. For the first time, it permits a statutory copyrightable inter-
est in a recording. Before passage of this act, no statutory copy-
right could be obtained on a recording based on the Supreme
Court decision in Apollo. The federal record piracy act permits a
record manufacturer to obtain copyright protection by placing a
symbol on each recording. The act, however, pertains only to
protection for the record manufacturer and does not give the com-
position copyright owner a copyright interest in the recording.
II. CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASES DEALING WITH RECORD OR
TAPE PIRACY
This section briefly analyzes and comments upon the more
significant cases in which the issue of record or tape piracy and
section 1(e) has been considered. The cases that have held in
favor of a copyright owner and against the "pirate" are first dis-
cussed. The authors use the term "pirate" throughout this com-
ment not to connote possible wrongdoing, but rather as a term of
convenience indicating one who duplicates a recording of another.
41 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
43 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972).
44 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir: 1972).
41 363 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
"1 The volume of business conducted each year by "pirates" exceeds $100 million.
International Tape Mfgr's Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38, 48 n.36 (1972).
41 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2,
5, 19, 20, 26, 101 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the federal record piracy act].
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A. Aeolian, Duchess, Fame, and Marks Sequence
In Aeolian the pirate duplicated perforated music rolls em-
bodying copyrighted music that the plaintiff had recorded with
permission of the copyright owner."8 The district court's decision
in favor of both the plaintiff and, in dicta, the copyright holder
is unenlightening since it merely sets forth a conclusion that is
devoid of detailed legal reasoning and citation of authority:
The provision of the statute [section l(e)] that "any other person
may make similar use of the copyrighted work" becomes automati-
cally operative by the grant of the license; but the subsequent user
does not thereby secure the right to copy the perforated rolls or
records. He cannot avail himself of the skill and labor of the original
manufacturer of the perforated roll or record by copying or duplicat-
ing the same, but must resort to the copyrighted composition or
sheet music, and not pirate the work of a competitor who has made
an original perforated roll."
The court is literally correct in stating above that a subse-
quent user under section 1(e) "does not thereby secure the right
to copy." The court, however, neglected to add that section 1(e)
does not mention copying, either implicitly or explicitly, and, it
therefore obviously neither gives nor denies anybody the right to
copy anything. Section 1(e) merely permits a subsequent user to
make "a similar use" of the copyrighted work. Thus, the conclu-
sion of Aeolian that he must "not pirate the work of a competitor"
would appear to be judicial pronouncement rather than a well-
reasoned decision.
In Duchess, the pirate duplicated recordings issued by the
plaintiff who was also the copyright owner of the recorded compo-
sitions. The Ninth Circuit held against the pirate:
The statute provides that anyone who properly invokes the li-
cense provision "may make similar use of the copyrighted work."
Rosner admits that she duplicates appellants' copyrighted composi-
tions. She does not make "similar use" of them, she makes exact
and identical copies of them. This is clearly outside the scope of the
compulsory license scheme.
Given our view that exact duplication is not "similar use," we
need not decide when a prospective licensee must invoke the com-
pulsory license scheme and file his notice of intention to use."
Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
, Id. at 927.
458 F.2d at 1310.
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The essence of the above reasoning in Duchess is:
(1) that section 1(e) permits only a similar use;
(2) that copying or duplicating is an identical and not
a similar use; and
(3) that copying is, therefore, outside the scope of sec-
tion 1(e).
The validity of this syllogistic reasoning rests entirely on the
court's premise that the term "identical" is not encompassed by
the scope of the term "similar." It is submitted that the court's
definition of terms may be seriously questioned on a number of
grounds.
First, from a common sense reading of section 1(e), it could
be argued that "similar" merely refers to the act of recording.
Consequently, after a copyright owner permits a first recording to
be made, subsequent recordings can be made by anyone who
gives the required notice and pays the required 2-cent royalty.
The legislative history of the act and the intent of Congress would
appear to support this interpretation.5 1 Congress was primarily
concerned about preventing record manufacturers/composition
copyright owners from becoming giant "music trusts."5 The term
"similar" presumably had no special meaning attached to it by
Congress, other than that the subsequent recordings need not be
identical to the first, but may deviate to some extent to take
advantage of the compulsory licensing provision and to prevent
the formation of "music trusts."
Secondly, an argument can be made that the Duchess defini-
tion of "similar" conflicts with historical precedence. Shafter53
analyzed the term "similar" and found it to permit some latitude
or deviation beyond being identical for subsequent reproducers.
He implied that "similar" not only includes "identical" reprod-
uctions, but also those reproductions deviating from an "identi-
cal" reproduction. Shafter's reasoning rested upon an analysis of
English and Canadian copyright law wherein the record that is
first recorded must be identically reproduced by subsequent re-
cordings without any variations unless permitted by the copy-
right owner. 4 The American copyright law by using the word
" See text accompanying note 34 supra.
52 HOUSE REPORT at 8.
A. SHAFrER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 330-35 (2d ed. 1939).
' Id. at 333.
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''similar" was a liberalization of the English and Canadian views.
According to Shafter, in the 1910's and 1920's, American musical
copyright owners attempted to narrow the deviation given to sub-
sequent recorders by arguing for a definition of "similar" that in
essence was indistinguishable from "identical." Now, with avail-
ability of sophisticated electronic duplicating equipment, copy-
right owners apparently have changed their position to the oppos-
ite view by arguing, as was held in Duchess, that "similar" does
not mean "identical." 5
A third argument that can be made against the Duchess
definition of "similar" is based on a dictionary definition of the
term. In one authority a number of cases are cited supporting the
proposition that "similar" means "exactly like; identical; exactly
corresponding."" Another authority supports the proposition that
the general class of "similar" objects includes the subclass of
"identical" objects.57
If any or all of the above arguments are correct, then the
Duchess view of "similar" is in error and the making of subse-
quent "identical" recordings is one of the similar uses included
within the scope of the term "similar" as used in section 1(e).
This, of course, does not mean that section 1(e) authorizes piracy.
It only means that a pirate must pay 2-cents per record.
If these arguments concerning the use of the term "similar"
are wrong and the definition in Duchess is correct, then a plethora
of definitional issues could be raised in the future regarding the
meaning of the term:
(1) Similarity of the rendition vehicle.
58
If the first recording was instrumental, must the second re-
cording be instrumental or can it be both instrumental and vocal?
Can it be vocal alone?
(2) Similarity of rendition style."
If the first recording was rock and roll, must the second re-
35 Id.
" BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1554 (4th ed. 1957) defines it as "[a]lso, sometimes,
exactly alike; identical; exactly corresponding (at least in all essential particulars)."
The word similar is often used to denote a partial resemblance only. But
it is also often used to denote sameness in all essential particulars.
Commonwealth v. Fontain, 127 Mass. 452, 454 (1879).
WF sTERs SEvmrr NEW COLLEGIATE DIcrIoNaRY 810 (1970).
See, e.g., Standard Music Roll Co. v. F.A. Mills, Inc., 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
See, e.g., Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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cording be rock and roll, or can it be a waltz?
(3) Similarity of the recording medium."
If the first recording was a record, can the second recording
be a tape?
(4) Similarity of the record speed."
If the first recording was at 33 RPM, must all subsequent
recordings be at the same speed?
(5) Similarity of the recording material.
If the first record was made of shellac, can the second record-
ing be of acetate composition?
In summary, the validity of the Duchess court's reasoning
rests entirely upon the logic of its definition of the term "similar."
If "similar" does encompass "identical," as urged by the authors,
the court is wrong. The preceeding discussion has argued that the
Duchess definition of "similar" is contrary to its plain meaning,
to historical precedence, and to present-day legal and grammati-
cal definitions of the term.
In Fame Publishing Co. v. S & S Distributors, Inc.,2 the
pirate duplicated authorized recordings and attempted to comply
with the notice and royalties provisions of section 1(e) by tender-
ing a check for the statutory amount to the plaintiff/composition
copyright owner. The plaintiff returned the proffered royalty and
sued for infringement, and requested a preliminary injunction.
The court held for the plaintiff by following the Duchess view that
"similar" does not include "identical."
Especially interesting is the court's statement that:
A compulsory licensee acquires no right to duplicate or reproduce
the recordings of another. Anyone who seeks to rely on the compul-
sory license premium must hire some musicians, take them into a
studio and make his own recording. 3
Unfortunately, Fame did not cite any authority for this startling
pronouncement which, in itself, would appear to raise a number
of interesting questions. For example, why must only "musi-
cians" be hired-what about a recording of a solo vocalist without
0 See, e.g., Standard Music Roll Co. v. F.A. Mills, Inc., 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
" See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 108.4611 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
NIMMER].
82 363 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
63 Id. at 988 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
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musicians? Why must the musicians be "hired"-what about
amateur musicians donating their services free of charge? Why
must the hired musicians be brought "into a studio"-what
about recording a marching band in a street parade?
Although these comments might appear to be unduly criti-
cal, they do illustrate the potential danger of loose language in
court decisions. Such loose language can have its genesis in a first
decision, be quoted and followed by successive decisions, and
ultimately become the "law of the land" even though the original
language is devoid of legal support or reasoning. Such a legal
evolution occurred with Aeolian, which was a judicial proclama-
tion regarding the meaning of the word "similar." This decision
was based upon no cited legal authority, was adopted in full by
Duchess, and later adopted from Duchess by Fame. In addition,
Aeolian pertained only to a cause of action brought by a licen-
see/record manufacturer. Duchess and Fame concerned the rights
of the copyright holder upon whose rights Aeolian expounded in
obiter dicta.
In justifying its decision Fame concluded:
It is not lightly to be inferred that Congress, in carving out the
compulsory licensing exception to the otherwise exclusive rights of
the copyright proprietor, intended thereby to sanction the type of
activity in which defendants engage. The compulsory licensing sys-
tem was designed to encourage various recordings of musical compo-
sition. To permit duplication of existing recordings under compul-
sory licensing would have the opposite effect. Rather than encourage
a multiplicity of recordings it would obviously discourage the pro-
duction of new recordings.6 '
The court might be correct regarding what Congress in-
tended had it given any consideration to the piracy problem.
Unfortunately, if this was the intent of Congress, it was never
expressed either in proscriptive legislation or guiding legislative
history. Consequently, the wording of section 1(e) in no way sup-
ports this statement by the Fame court.
Marks is the most recent case following Aeolian, Duchess,
and Fame. Marks as copyright owner had authorized several re-
cording companies to make recordings. Colorado Magnetics, with
no authorization from Marks, but fulfilling the notice and 2-cent
royalty tender requirements of section 1(e), purchased the au-
", Id. (emphasis added).
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thorized hit records on the open market, duplicated them with
recording equipment, and then sold the duplicated recordings at
a substantially lower price. Marks then brought a copyright in-
fringement action against Colorado Magnetics seeking damages
and injunctive relief.
The majority in Marks embraced the Duchess reasoning:
In Duchess, the majority held that the phrase "similar use" within
the meaning of the Act of 1909 does not include the "right to copy"
the recordings of others. We agree and are generally persuaded that
the majority opinion in Duchess sets forth the proper interpretation
of the statute. 5
The validity of the argument that a "similar use" is not an
"identical use" has already been discussed in connection with
Duchess.
Marks contains a number of additional observations and con-
clusions of questionable validity. Consider the assertion that a
subsequent recorder may not use a third party's record but must
begin with the raw material (i.e., the copyrighted composition)
in a manner "similar" to that employed by the first recording:
This means, to us, that one who complies with royalty payment
called for by the statute, though not having any authorization from
the copyright owner, may nonetheless then "use," not a third party's
record, but the copyrighted composition, which has been character-
ized as the "raw material," in a manner "similar" to that employed
by the recording company which did have authorization from the
copyright owner. .... 11
While this may be what section 1(e) means to the court, it is not
expressly so stated in section 1(e) and the court did not cite any
authority indicating how it arrived at this conclusion.
In another portion of the opinion, the court noted that sec-
tion 1(e) does not affirmatively authorize duplication:
There is, of course, nothing in the statute which affirmatively au-
thorizes Magnetics to duplicate and copy the recording of one li-
censed by the copyright owner to reproduce his composition .... 1,
While this is literally correct, it is equally correct to state that the
statute does not affirmatively prohibit duplication. A more accur-
ate statement would be that the statute is totally silent on the
subject and neither authorizes nor prohibits duplication.





The Marks court apparently modified the holding of Fame
which advanced the incredible proposition that in order to be a
"similar use," a subsequent user must "hire musicians." The
Tenth Circuit changed the mandatory "must" to the permissive
"may" and stated:
However, under the statute Magnetics may "use" the copyright
composition in a manner "similar" to that made by the licensed
recording company. All of which means, to us, that Magnetics may
make its own arrangements, hire its own musicians and artists, and
then record. It does not mean that Magnetics may use the com-
poser's copyrighted work by duplicating and copying the record of a
licensed recording company. Such, in our view, is not a similar use."
The court's comment is somewhat irrelevant since the issue
before it was, in essence, must "musicians be hired" (not may)
in order to constitute a "similar use" under section 1(e).
And finally, Marks found the compulsory licensing provision
of section 1(e) to be an exception to or a limitation of the general
policy in the Copyright Act of extending the protection to the
owner of the copyrighted composition. Apparently worried about
the prevalence of tape piracy, Marks holds:
It is the general rule that a proviso should be strictly construed to
the end that an exception does not devour the general policy which
a law may embody."
Using such strict construction, the court thereupon construed the
words "similar use" in the compulsory licensing provision as not
"authorizing" Magnetics to copy or duplicate the recordings orig-
inally authorized by Marks.
In summary, Marks sets forth no new reasoning or citation
of authority in ruling for the copyright owner and against the
pirate. The decision appears to be a mixture of earlier cases hold-
ing the same way. In particular, it adopts the views of Duchess
that "similar" does not encompass "identical" as well as the
Fame theory that "one must (may) go out and hire musicians."
B. Jondora
The remaining portion of this section discusses a decision
which held that section 1(e) does not prohibit tape or record
" Id. (emphasis added).
6 Id., citing Shilkret v. Musicraft Records, Inc., 131 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1942). Professor
Nimmer objects to this construction, saying "[tihis position appears to be tenuous in




piracy. The District Court of New Jersey in Jondora Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc. ,70 which was decided after
Duchess but before Marks, severely criticized Aeolian and
Duchess.7
The plaintiff/copyright owners in Jondora sued the defen-
dant/pirates for copyright infringement, and the pirates moved to
dissolve the preliminary injunction. The district court granted
the pirates' motion, and in essence, held that piracy is not prohib-
ited by section 1(e).
Jondora defined the legal issue as follows:
[Did Congress by the Copyright Act of 1909 grant to musical com-
position copyright holders the power to prevent third persons from
copying a particular performance of that composition, where (a)
with the copyright holder's permission, the performance has already
been fixed on a physical object capable of reproducing it, and (b)
the third person has complied with the compulsory license provi-
sions of the Act by filing and serving notices of intention and paying
royalties to the copyright holders?"
In resolving this issue, the court concluded:
It is my view that the Duchess opinion . . . erroneously inter-
prets the "compulsory license" provision of the Copyright Act. Sim-
ply stated, that court believed that because a musical composition
is copyrighted, the unauthorized reproduction of the performance
embodied in the sound recording of that composition is, and ought
to be, prohibited by federal copyright laws. But that clearly was not
the law when Duchess was decided. Neither performance nor record-
ing was copyrightable. It might have been unethical, or, in some
states, because there was a felt necessity for statutory intervention,
a crime to "steal" a recording of a performance and thereafter sell
it as your own. But clearly the licensee-manufacturer had no claim
under the Copyright Act. 3
Jondora supported its disagreement with Duchess by the fol-
lowing quote from Nimmer:
Assuming such a record pirate duly serves a notice of intent to use,
and pays the compulsory license royalties, the somewhat astounding
result is that as to those sound recordings fixed prior to February 15,
1972, he is not an infringer under the Copyright Act. The only por-
tion of that which he has recorded which is protectible under the
Copyright Act, with respect to sound recordings fixed prior to Febru-
ary 15, 1972, is the musical composition itself, and that he is author-
70 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972).
Id. at 578.
Id. at 577.
73 Id. at 580 (citations omitted).
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ized to use for recording purposes upon payment of the statutory
royalties. All of the other elements contained in the original record
which he has without authority duplicated are not copyrightable,
and hence his use of such other elements does not give rise to an
action for copyright infringement."
The court then discussed at length the new federal record
piracy act and supported its decision in favor of the pirate by
observing that Congress obviously did not intend section 1(e) to
prohibit tape piracy:
I also find persuasive defendant's argument that if Congress
had intended to make duplicators liable after October 15, 1971, for
infringement of musical composition copyrights, regardless of
whether the duplicator complied with the compulsory license provi-
sion, Congress could have simply amended § 1(e) by excluding from
the benefits thereof those making an "exact" or "identical" copy of
a pre-existing recording. Thus, if Congress had desired to make all
duplicators immediately liable for infringement of musical composi-
tion copyrights, it easily could have done so by restricting the com-
pulsory license privilege in some fashion. Instead, Congress created
a new copyright in the sound recordings of performances of copy-
righted musical works, effective, however, only with respect to per-
formances on recordings that were "fixed, published and copy-
righted" four months after the effective date of the 1971 Amend-
ment.75
The Jondora court supports its findings with reasonable pre-
cision by analyzing legislative intent and judicial precedents, and
by strictly interpreting section 1(e). Even though the decision is
rather lengthy, the specific holding of Jondora is that section 1(e)
of the Copyright Act of 1909 does not prohibit tape piracy and
that it, therefore, does not provide the composition copyright
owner the right to sue a tape pirate for copyright infringement.
The authors respectfully submit, in agreement with the dis-
sent in Marks,7" that Jondora correctly construed section 1(e)
with regard to a reasonable meaning of the words used in the
statute as well as to the possible legislative intent of Congress in
enacting section 1(e). While the authors abhor such sharp busi-
ness practices as record and tape piracy, they believe that the
problem should not be solved by court decisions which read into
351 F. Supp. at 580, quoting NIMMER § 108.4621 at 432-33.
7' 351 F. Supp. at 584.
7' Chief Judge Lewis stated in his dissent:
I am in complete accord with the views of Judge Lacey set forth in
[Jondora] .... I would affirm on this aspect of the case only.
497 F.2d at 291-92.
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the statute that which is not there or which distort the plain
meaning of the words used in the statute.
III. STATE ANTI-PIRACY REMEDIES
The purpose of this section is not to review the prolific litiga-
tion and commentary on the right of a state to protect record
manufacturers (as opposed to copyright holders) against piracy.7 7
A brief review of unfair competition and state anti-piracy stat-
utes, however, in relation to section 1(e) will present the remedies
available to the record manufacturer and not available to the
copyright holder.
A. Unfair Competition
At least seven states" enjoin record piracy by relying on the
theory of misappropriation as set forth in International News
Service v. Associated Press" ("INS"). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court80 in adopting the rule of INS stated the elements of misap-
propriation to be
[tihe defendant's use of the plaintiffs product, into which the
plaintiff has put time, skill, and money; and the defendant's use of
the plaintiff's product or a copy of it in competition with the plain-
tiff and gaining an advantage in that competition because the plain-
tiff, and not the defendant, has expended the energy to produce it.
The wrong is not in the copying, but in the appropriation of the
plaintiff's time, effort and money.A'
Tape pirates defend against an INS cause of action with
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,"2 and Compco Corp. v. Day-
" See, e.g., Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 49 (1969); Yankwich, Unfair Competition as an Aid to Equity in Patent, Copyright
& Trade-Mark Cases, 32 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 438 (1957); Note, Copyrights: States Al-
lowed to Protect Works Not Copyrightable Under Federal Law, 58 MINN. L. REv. 316
(1973); Note, Goldstein v. California: A New Outlook For the Misappropriation Doctrine,
8 U. SAN FRAN. L. Rlv. 199 (1973); Comment, Performers' Rights & Copyright: The
Protection of Sound Recordings From Modern Pirates, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 548 (1971).
"' See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970); NBC v. Nance,
506 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N.C.
App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 702, 181 S.E. 2d 600 (1971); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y. Supp. 2d 553 (Sup. Ct.
1964); CBS v. Custom Recording Co., 258 S.C. 465, 189 S.E.2d 305, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1007 (1972); Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 163,
218 N.W.2d 705 (1974).
7' 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 163, 218
N.W.2d 705 (1974).
Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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Brite Lighting, Inc.,3 by maintaining that the Supreme Court in
Sears and Compco overruled or severely restricted INS.
Sears and Compco held that unpatented mechanical devices
such as lamp fixtures and lamps may be sold freely even though
their designs are copied and that state unfair competition laws
have no effect on the sales. The Court concluded in Sears that the
purpose of the federal patent system was to promote invention
and to preserve free competition by securing a monopoly for a
limited time, and, therefore, under the supremacy clause, state
unfair competition laws could not be permitted to give perpetual
monopoly protection."
Tape pirates defend their actions by relying upon dicta in
Sears and Compco as it pertains to copyrights. They maintain
that to permit the record manufacturer to use the INS misappro-
priation doctrine is to give him a perpetual monopoly that is in
direct contradiction to the Constitution's mandate "to fix for
limited times." The issue became more complex with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Goldstein v. California."
In Goldstein the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
neither explicitly precludes states from granting copyrights, nor
grants exclusive authority in this field to the federal government.
Goldstein upheld a California tape piracy penal statute on the
basis that, until Congress acts, the states are free to provide pro-
tection without worry of federal preemption."8
After Goldstein, tape pirates defend against an unfair com-
petition claim by arguing that Goldstein in light of Sears and
Compco should be narrowly interpreted to include only statutory
enactments and not common-law adjudications. 8 The resolution
of this issue is not of concern for the present analysis of section
1(e) and the Marks case.
B. State Statutory Enactments
Even though section 1(e) was not the central issue litigated,
the case of International Tape Manufacturers Association v.
Gerstein 8 is of interest with respect to the present discussion.
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
376 U.S. at 230-31.
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
u Id. at 560.
11 Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 163, 218
N.W.2d 705 (1974).
u 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
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Gerstein was a class action suit by tape pirates against the Attor-
ney General of Florida. The pirates sought relief from future pros-
ecutions under a Florida anti-tape piracy statute by maintaining
that the statute was unconstitutional." Their claim was based on
the immunity found in the federal copyright laws. The court in
Gerstein agreed with the pirates and found the Florida statute
unconstitutional.
Gerstein observed that, in its opinion, the validity of INS was
severly eroded by Sears and Compco. The court relied on an oft-
quoted portion of Compco:0
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state
law may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying
would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, of
the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allow-
ing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright
laws leave in the public domain."
The Gerstein finding of the Florida anti-tape piracy statute
to be unconstitutional was essentially overruled when the Su-
preme Court in Goldstein upheld the constitutionality of a simi-
lar California statute.
The Supreme Court in Goldstein granted certiorari to review
Goldstein's conviction under a California statute making it a
criminal offense to pirate recordings of others. The California
statute protected owners of a master recording from piracy for an
unlimited duration. The Court eliminating any doubt that this
created a perpetual monopoly stated:
No limitation is placed on the use of the music, lyrics, or arrange-
ment employed in making the master recording. Petitioners are not
precluded from hiring their own musicians and artists and recording
an exact imitation of the performance embodied on the master re-
cording. Petitioners are even free to hire the same artists who made
the initial recording in order to duplicate the performance. In ess-
ence, the statute thus provides copyright protection solely for the
specific expressions which compose the master record or tape."
The Court discussed, in depth, the history, origin, and con-
stitutional objectives of the copyright clause and concluded that
both a national and a state copyright system can coexist without
conflict.
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 543.041 (1972).
Id. at 49.
376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
412 U.S. at 550.
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Although the Copyright Clause thus recognizes the potential
benefits of a national system, it does not indicate that all writings
are of national interest or that state legislation is, in all cases, unnec-
essary or precluded. The patents granted by the States in the 18th
century show, to the contrary, a willingness on the part of the States
to promote those portions of science and the arts which were of local
importance. Whatever the diversity of people's backgrounds, origins
and interests and whatever the variety of business and industry in
the 13 Colonies, the range of diversity is obviously far greater today
in a country of 210 million people in 50 States. In view of that
enormous diversity, it is unlikely that all citizens in all parts of the
country place the same importance on works relating to all subjects.
Since the subject matter to which the Copyright Clause is addressed
may thus be of purely local importance and not worthy of national
attention or protection, we cannot discern such an unyielding na-
tional interest as to require an inference that state power to grant
copyrights has been relinquished to exclusive federal control."
As we have seen, the language of the Constitution neither ex-
plicitly precludes the States from granting copyrights nor grants
such authority exclusively to the Federal Government. The subject
matter to which the Copyright Clause is addressed may at times be
of purely local concern. No conflict will necessarily arise from a lack
of uniform state regulation, nor will the interest of one State be
significantly prejudiced by the actions of another. No reason exists
why Congress must take affirmative action either to authorize pro-
tection of all categories of writings or to free them from all restraint.
We therefore conclude that, under the Constitution, the States have
net relinquished all power to grant to authors "the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings.""
In relation to section 1(e), Goldstein stated:
Petitioners do not argue that § 653h [the California statute at
issue] conflicts with [section 1(e)] ...
Assuming, arguendo, that petitioners' use of the composition
they duplicated constitutes a "similar use,".... We do not see in
these statutes the direct conflict necessary to render a state statute
invalid. 5
While the above statement is obiter dicta, it is interesting
that the Supreme Court upon a reading of section 1(e) implied
that pirate duplication is a permissable "similar use" under sec-
tion 1(e), and that the state anti-piracy statutes do not conflict
with section 1(e). The first implication is opposite to the interpre-
Id. at 556-57 (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 560.
Id. at 566, n.23.
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tation of "similar use" by the Tenth Circuit in Marks. In regards
to the second implication, Aeolian, as it pertains to the record
manufacturer, is overruled. In Aeolian, the manufacturer of re-
cords was found to have a "copyright" interest in his recording
which would support a claim of infringement against the pirate.
If this were viable law, then the California statute in Goldstein
would, of necessity, be unconstitutional and pre-empted under
the supremacy clause. The Court in Goldstein found no such
"direct conflict" thus overruling Aeolian by an assumption ar-
guendo.
In summary, Goldstein opened the door for states to provide
statutory protection against the tape pirate who duplicates an-
other's recording.
However, in view of the federal record piracy act, there ap-
pears to be a diminishing need for state statutory action in this
field since all records recorded after February 15, 1972, are pro-
tected by the federal act."
CONCLUSION
The status of the law regarding tape piracy depends on a
number of factors including the time the copies of the recording
were originally recorded, the place the act of piracy occurred, and
the person claiming a cause of action against the pirate.
With regards to a record manufacturer, the federal record
piracy act protects records that are first fixed, published and
copyrighted on and after February 15, 1972. Therefore, the status
of the law of piracy with respect to such recordings is well settled.
The pirating of such records is prohibited and the manufacturer
has a cause of action against the pirate.
Also, the law is well settled for recordings first fixed prior to
the federal record piracy act in those states having a record or
tape piracy act. In such states civil or criminal remedies may be
available for the record manufacturer against the pirate. In those
states not having anti-piracy statutes, unfair competition reme-
dies may be provided the record manufacturer under the INS
misappropriation doctrine. Some states, however, have adopted
neither the INS doctrine nor appropriate statutory remedies.
Therefore, in some states a pirate may legally duplicate the re-
cordings of a record manufacturer prior to February 15, 1972, on
"6 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2,
5, 19, 20, 26, 101 (1970).
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those recordings which do not have the required copyright notice.
With regards to the composition copyright owner who is also
the record manufacturer, it is clear that he has recourse to all of
the above listed remedies due to his role as record manufacturer.
The remedies of one who is only a composition copyright owner
under section 1(e) are unsettled.
The circuits are split as to whether section 1(e) provides the
owner of the composition copyright a right to sue for copyright
infringement or take any other legal action against a pirate.
Jondora held that the copyright owner does not have any such
right; the Marks, Duchess, Fame, and Aeolian courts support the
contrary view. The reasoning of Jondora was based on legislative
and judicial precedents as well as the observation that section
1(e) does not expressly prohibit piracy.
Duchess followed Aeolian and held that the term "similar"
does not include "identical" recordings. Therefore, since pirated
recordings are "identical," they are not a similar use permitted
by section 1(e). Fame and Marks agreed with the Duchess defini-
tion of "similar." The Supreme Court should accept the petition
for certiorari and settle the above conflict as to the construction
of section 1(e).
POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the writing of the above comment, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's decision in Jondora and held against the tape pirate." The
Third Circuit majority in Jondora adhered to the Marks and
Duchess definition of "similar use" and strongly emphasized that
duplicators or pirates do not "use" the composer's work at all. It is
a recording which is used. Rather than permit the use of a recording
of the composition, the statute only authorizes the use of the copy-
righted work, that is the written score. 7
Judge Gibbons, however, strongly dissented:
It is apparent that both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
attempted to provide a remedy which was not envisaged by the 1909
Act .... The Third Circuit should not follow like children of Hom-
elin their erroneous piping."
The Solicitor General filed the amicus brief requested by the
Supreme Court in the Marks case and recommended denial of
'a 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974).
'7 Id. at 395.
" Id. at 396, 401 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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certiorari. 9 In recommending denial of certiorari the Solicitor
General agreed with the Duchess, Marks, and Jondora reasoning
of "similar use" and further stated:
There is no conflict among the circuits, and, although "piracy" is
an important law enforcement problem, the importance of the issues
will steadily diminish. The construction of Section 1(e) is now im-
portant only with respect to recordings issued before February 15,
1972. The music on these discs and tapes will gradually become less
popular, and therefore less attractive to "pirates." 100
Although the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari,"' the au-
thors believe that their arguments concerning the judicial pro-
nouncements of Aeolian, Duchess, Marks, and, now, Jondora, as
well as the congressional intent in passing section 1(e), are still
valid.
" BNA, A-21, No. 210 (Jan. 9, 1975).
10 Id. at A-22.
101 Id.
